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PATENTS-PRIOR PUBLICATION-APPLICATION OF SECTION 102(B) TO PLANT
PATENTS-Appellant applied for a plant patent on two roses1 which he had
developed. The Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed the final rejection
of the application on the basis of section 102(b)2 of the patent statute.
Pictures and classifications of the varieties of roses sought to be patented
had appeared in printed publications3 more than one year before appellant's

1 Rosa Floribunda plants, application serial numbers 709,127 and 709,128, filed
Jan. 15, 1958.
!l 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1958): "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ••. (b)
the invention was described in a printed publication .•. more than one year prior to
the date of application for patent in the United States ...•"
3 A printed publication is anything that is printed and made accessible to any part
of the public. See, e.g., Rosenwasser v. Spieth, 129 U.S. 47 (1889); Interchemical Corp.
v. Sinclair & Carroll Co., 50 F. Supp. 881, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). However, the mere
existence of a printed thing is not a printed publication. See Britton v. White Mfg. Co.,
61 Fed. 93 (C.C.D. Conn. 1894); Cottier v. Stimson, 20 Fed. 906 (C.C.D. Ore. 1884).
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application. 4 On appeal, held, reversed. In order to bar issuance of a plant
patent, a description in a printed publication must convey such knowledge
as to place the invention within the public domain. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d
929 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
The provisions of the statute pertaining to plant patents grant to whomever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new
variety of plant5 the right to exclude others from asexually reproducing
the plant or selling or using the plant so reproduced. 6 In addition, they
require that all of the provisions relating to patents for other inventions,
except where specifically excluded, shall be applicable to plant patents.7
Thus, in order to qualify for the granting of a plant patent, petitioner
must, among other things, satisfy section 102(b),8 which determines one of
the requisite conditions for the existence of patentable novelty. Since the
application of section 102(b) to plants had not been adjudicated prior to
this case, the arguments presented by both parties were based substantially
on policy. These arguments can be resolved into two issues. The first is
whether the description under section 102(b), in order to bar patentability
of inventions in general, must be so complete as to enable a person skilled
in the art or science to which it appertains to practice the invention, while
the second issue is whether the construction of section 102(b), when applied
to plants, should be the same as that applied to patents for other inventions.
The respondent asserted that a mere description, although insufficient to
place the plant in the public domain, would be adequate to bar the issuance
of the patent,9 while the petitioner argued that the requisite description to
bar patentability must be an "enabling" one.10 There is force to the reasoning in support of both of these positions; however, the latter, accepted in
the principal case, seems to be the more compelling and necessary conclusion. This is true not only from a simple resolution of the issues on the
basis of precedent, but from a consideration of the practical consequences
which result from each of the two contradicting interpretations when viewed
in the light of the policies and goals of the patent system.
The question of whether an enabling description is required under section 102(b) for all patents, other than plants, is of prime importance to the
basic purposes of the patent system. There is no logical foundation in the
4 1949 NAT'L RosE Soc'Y ANNUAL OF ENG. 155, and 1954 NAT'L RosE Soc'y ANNUAL
ENG. 156, 157.
5 Congress in using the word "plant" was speaking in the common language of the
people and did not use the word in its strict scientific sense. In re Arzberger, 27 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 1315, 112 F.2d 834 (1940).
6 35 u.s.c. §§ 161, 163 (1958).
7 35 u.s.c. § 161 (1958).
8 See note 2 supra.
9 Brief for Appellee, p. 5.
10 Brief for Appellant, p. 22. An "enabling" description must contain and exhibit a
substantial representation of the patented improvement so as to enable any person skilled
in the art or science to which it appertains to make, construct, and practice the invention.
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 555 (1870). See principal case at 936.
OF
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field of patents for following a "mere description" test. The theory behind
the publication bar of section 102(b) is that, once an invention has been
placed in the public domain, no one shall be permitted to recapture it by
means of a patent monopoly. 11 Thus, if the description is not enabling,
it is clear that the invention has not been placed in the public domain, and
patentability should not be barred. This is illustrated by the familiar
practice of viewing the patent grant as being analogous to a contract. 12
If the disclosure is an enabling one, the patent should not be issued since
the public derives no benefit thereby and there is no consideration given
by the applicant for the grant of such a limited monopoly. 13 In accordance
with this view, the majority of cases have required that, in order to invoke
the restriction contemplated by section 102(b), the description must be
such as to enable one who is skilled in the particular art to duplicate the
invention. 14 These decisions are reinforced by the writers, who are unanimous in their recognition of the desirability of this position. 15 Thus, compelled by the weight of authority and the logical development underlying
it, the court in the principal case found it necessary to criticize and distinguish those decisions which had held that section I02(b) does not require
an enabling description.10
Despite the absence of any authority clearly contrary to the proposition
that an enabling description is also required to bar plant patents, the
court's conclusion in that regard should be examined in the light of the
congressional intent and the public policy underlying the patent laws.
Unfortunately, the fact that tlie Plant Patent Act was passed in great haste,
coupled with the lack of any clearly pertinent manifestations of congressional intent, leads to the conclusion that the problem presented by the
principal case was probably not recognized, and almo~t certainly was not
l SMITH, PATENT LAW vii (1954).
ALLYN, THE FIRST PLANT PATENTS 18, 19 (1934).
Id. at 19.
14 Eames v. Andrews, 122 U.S. 40, 66 (1887); Downton v. Yeager Milling Co., 108
U.S. 466 (1883); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 555 (1870); Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation v. George A. Breon & Co., 85 F.2d 166 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 598 (1936); Young Radiator Co. v. Modine Mfg. Co., 55 F.2d 545 (7th
Cir. 1931); De Cew v. Union Bag & Paper Corp., 57 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.J. 1944).
111 CURTIS, PATENTS § 294 (4th ed. 1873); 1 ROBINSON, PATENTS §§ 325-30 (1890);
1 WALKER, PATENTS § 50 (Deller ed. 1937).
16 Cohn v. United States Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366 (1876). Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals: In re Attwood, 45 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 824, 253 F.2d 234 (1958); In re Baranauckas,
43 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 727, 228 F.2d 413 (1955); In re Inman, 43 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 709, 228
F.2d 229 (1955); In re Kebrich, 40 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 780, 201 F.2d 951 (1953); In re
Shackell, 39 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 847, 194 F.2d 720 (1952); In re Michalek, 34 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 1124, 162 F.2d 229 (1947); In re Stoll, 34 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1058, 161 F.2d 241
(1947); In re Crosley, 34 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 882, 159 F.2d 735 (1947); In re Fink, 20
C.C.P.A. (Patents) 716, 62 F.2d 103 (1932); In re Marden & Rentschler, 18 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 1119, 48 F.2d 428 (1931). Circuit and District Courts: Merck & Co. v. Marzall,
197 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1957),
aff'd, 252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958); General Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio, 17 F.2d 90
(D. Del. 1927); One-Piece Bifocal Lens Co. v. Bisight Co., 246 Fed. 450 (D. Md. 1917),
decree modified, 259 Fed. 275 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 606 (1919).
11
12
13
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resolved by Congress at the time of passage.17 On the other hand, when
viewed from the standpoint of the public interest, it can be seen that the
result in the principal case more nearly conforms to the goals of the patent
system. It has been stated that the purposes of the patent grant are to encourage and reward inventors,18 expand the general distribution of the
invention for the benefit of the public,19 and to make it finally available
to all after seventeen years.20 The relevant theory is that a patent is similar
to a contract, the consideration for the grant by the government being the
disclosure to the public of something worthwhile which would not otherwise have been known. 21 When considered from the standpoint of patent
policy, the practical consequences of denial of a plant patent, merely on the
basis of a prior but non-enabling description, are significant. If the plant
application is denied, the applicant is faced with two choices. He must
either place the plant on the market, making excessive charges for specimens
in order to avail himself of his only opportunity for financial reimbursement before clippings of his plant are reproduced and marketed by another in competition, or he must keep the original plant off the market so
as to avoid competition with another subsequently patented plant, created
by him from the original plant, and possessing the desirable features of the
original. Neither of these results is in the public interest or within the basic
philosophy of the patent statute. The first alternative would lead to high
prices and limited distribution, while the second would make the plant
inaccessible to the public in favor of a substitute. On the other hand, the
uniform application of section 102(b) to all inventions, including plants,
would allow for the rewarding of the inventor and a wider distribution to
the public at a lower price, without recapturing anything already made
available to the public in the prior publication.
The ramifications resulting from the court's application of section 102(b)
are twofold. The first is the effect it will have on clarifying the standard
17 See ALLYN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 57. The intent of Congress was to encourage
the invention and discovery of new plants by providing agriculture with the same op•
portunity as that provided by the patent system to the ,manufacturing industry. H.R.
REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. I (1930). The intent to place agriculturists on the
same level as others can arguably be relied upon for the proposition that Congress
intended § 102(b) to be applied in the same manner for all patents. However, the fact
that this intent is limited to the "practicable" lends credence to the argument that only
the same opportunity, and not the same tests, should apply. And although § 162 of the
act [35 U.S.C. § 162 (1958)] provides that the disclosure of a plant patent application
need only present as complete a description as is reasonably possible, thus intimating
that Congress was aware of the virtual impossibility of providing an enabling description
of a plant, any conclusion therefrom as to a possible congressional resolution of the
problem is mere conjecture.
1s E.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 139 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir,
1943); Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed. 358 (7th Cir),
cert. granted, 207 U.S. 589, petition for cert. dismissed, 210 U.S. 439 (1907).
19 E.g., Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945);
Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 132 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1947).
20 35 u.s.c. § 154 (1958).
21 See ALLYN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 18, 19.
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applied to all patents under section 102(b). Although this court cannot overrule the Supreme Court or the other circuits, its handling of the principal
case should cause a reconsideration of the loose language used in the interpretation of this section, and may well influence those courts to adopt the
test which requires an enabling description. The second ramification of the
court's decision is more closely related to the initial problem of the principal
case, in that it results from the struggle to find an acceptable solution of how
to apply section 102(b) to plants. Under the court's decision many problems
are still present and unsolved. The anomaly of having section 102(b) prohibit an impossibility when applied to plant patents is still present, because
an enabling description of a plant cannot be made. 22 In addition, there is
no way to prevent the patentee from extending his monopoly by advertising
and showing the plant for many years, and then, after a demand has been
created, applying for patent protection. And finally, the contract analogy
fails because the consideration given by the patentee can be negated by the
disappearance or extinction of the plant, as there is no guarantee provided
by an enabling disclosure that the patented item will ever enter the public
domain.
The remedy for these problems, as well as others, cannot be handled
by the courts within the present statutory framework. A feasible solution
seems possible only through remedial legislation. As an initial step it might
be well to abolish the applicability of substantive provisions to both plant
and other patents, since there is no logical reason why the goal of the
patent system cannot be effectuated without relating the general provisions of title 35 to plant patents. A chapter with autonomous provisions
would immediately relieve the existence of the section 102(b) "anomaly"
and others which might be latently present. In addition, in order to assure
that the plant will not become extinct before expiration of the patent, a
provision could be enacted requiring the placement of a sample with the
patent office, so that clippings would be available to the public. If physical
and economic factors would limit the applicability of this provision, a
compulsory licensing system could be initiated. Another possible provision
which •might be enacted would be one which would cause the length of the
term of protection of the patent to be decreased by the delay between the
date of prior publication and the filing of the patent application. This
would not only curb the possible problem of the extension of patent protection, but would provide for the encouragement of the statutory standard
which provides for the granting of patents only to "new" varieties.23 Although these recommendations for remedial legislation are far from comprehensive, they do evidence the need for a new approach based on a reexamination of the plant patent provisions.
Ira ]. Jaffe, S.Ed.
22 This is true under the restrictions of today's scientific knowledge; however, advancements in this area arc likely to result from the active research in the field. See principal
case at 939 n.7.
23 35 u.s.c. § 161 (1958).

